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When assessing the information base of justice the capability approach focuses not just on 
people’s actual achievements of well-being, but their freedom to achieve functionings. One 
of the advantages of this approach is that it allows us to widen the information base by 
adding a causal dimension to analyses of capability deficits. So starving can be distinguished 
from fasting by noting whether a person has the freedom to be malnourished. Including this 
information in justice and policy considerations allows us to redirect our attention and 
resources to individuals who lack freedom. Yet, although freedom has figured prominently 
in discussions of the approach, the sense in which an individual’s personal responsibility for 
his or her disadvantage is relevant for questions of justice and equality has received 
relatively little attention. This is surprising given the prominent role the concept of 
responsibility has played in recent debates about justice and equality. But it is also surprising 
because theories of justice and equality typically accept that taking responsibility for the 
consequences of one’s choices is a key criterion in deciding when to permit inequalities. In 
what follows, I will argue that the role the concept of responsibility should play in 
assessments of compensation and redistribution in a capability-based account of justice 
needs clarification. Further, that while a capability account must address the issue of 
responsibility in certain contexts, these are more limited than many liberals and supporters of 
the capability approach suggest. In section I, I will look at the role and scope of 
responsibility in recent debates in liberal political theory. In relation to the starving/fasting 
                                            
1 This paper was originally presented to the ‘Third Conference on the Capability Approach: From 
Sustainable Development to Sustainable Freedom’, University of Pavia, Italy, Sept 7-9, 2003. I would 
like to thank the conference participants and an anonymous reader for Ethics and Economics for their 
comments. I would also like to thank Melissa Lane for passing on some critical comments. 
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example above, many liberal theorists claim that the fasting person has exercised their 
freedom and the result, though unfortunate, is their responsibility and plausibly not a matter 
of injustice. In section II, I will consider how Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have dealt 
with this issue and, in section III, I will discuss two objections to using responsibility as a 
criterion for deciding whether to permit inequalities. My approach will be to determine 
where and for what reason (moral, epistemological) we should take responsibility into 
account. Finally, in section IV, I will outline an approach that is consistent with the 
capability framework by focusing on what I take to be the ethos of the capability approach.  
 
Before proceeding, I should say something about why I will focus on equality within a 
system of national justice and not on some of the other fields in which the capability 
approach has been prominent. The capability approach has been employed in the fields of 
international development, global justice and debates about equality. In common with other 
approaches to personal and social advantage, in all of these spaces it functions as a metric 
against which outcomes of personal and social advantage can be judged. Each of these 
spaces introduces different constraints on the extent to which various capabilities might be 
achieved. For instance, the available resources needed to implement a capability approach 
might be more severely constrained where standards of living are particularly low, or where 
social problems are acute. This is often the case in international development and within 
international justice more generally. In both of these areas capability deficits are often 
severe. So severe, in fact, that there are good reasons to think that our focus should be on 
addressing these deficits and not, perhaps, on attributing individual blame or praise to the 
disadvantaged. In contrast, capability deficits within systems of national justice are often 
subject to determinations concerning individual praise and blame. For instance, debate in 
recent liberal theory has focused on when an individual’s responsibility for their 
disadvantage is politically relevant. One of the reasons for this is that in developed societies 
there are more options for citizens as well as more resources to redistribute. This is not to 
deny that severe poverty does not exist in European or North American countries or that 
because a citizen of a particular country has access to more resources he or she, therefore, 
deserves them. But because of the general wealth of those countries and the relatively large 
range of choices that people have, personal responsibility is relevant for determining when to 
permit inequalities. Personal responsibility is still very important for determining how we 
might address issues of disadvantage in the future, but because of the often life-threatening 
nature of these capability deficits we often put considerations of responsibility to one side. 
Whereas, it has been in connection with debates surrounding equality within a national 
setting that the issue of the role and scope of responsibility has played a central role. It is to 
these issues that I now turn. 
 
I. EGALITARIANISM AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
The idea that it is fair that we should bear the costs of the decisions for which we are 
responsible and be compensated for bad luck for which we are not responsible is a powerful 
and important idea in egalitarian thought. Its influence on debates about equality and 
egalitarianism is profound. What Elizabeth Anderson has called ‘Luck Egalitarianism’ can 
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be characterised by precisely this idea.2 Luck egalitarianism is a family of theories whose 
defining trait is that the goal of egalitarianism is to eliminate the effects of bad brute luck. 
What is relevant for our purposes is the important role that responsibility plays for 
determining when to permit inequalities. There are different versions of these responsibility-
based views to be sure, but let me very briefly sketch the most influential version put 
forward by Ronald Dworkin.3 
 
While the subject of considerable debate, Dworkin’s account of the role of responsibility 
nonetheless serves as a good example of how the concept of responsibility functions as a 
criterion for deciding when individuals should be compensated for disadvantage. According 
to Dworkin, equal concern is the sovereign virtue of political community and showing such 
concern is how governments gain legitimacy.4 Dworkin’s interpretation of this ideal of 
equality is equality in the space of resources, wherein equality is achieved by providing 
everyone with a set of resources that satisfies an envy test. As a way of identifying when to 
permit inequalities Dworkin introduced the distinction between option luck, which is a 
matter of ‘how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out...’5 and brute luck, which is a 
matter of ‘how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles’.6 As presented 
here, the distinction between these two types of luck corresponds to those situations and 
events that are a result of a person’s choice and those that are not. Dworkin makes it clear 
that these two types of luck separate the person from their circumstances. This distinction is 
crucial to liberal egalitarians because society, according to Dworkin, should aim to improve 
the position of people who are physically handicapped or otherwise unable to earn a 
satisfactory income, for example—but should not aim to mitigate or compensate for 
differences in personality—for differences traceable to the fact that some people’s tastes and 
ambitions are expensive and other people’s are cheap, for instance.7  
 
So the person with expensive tastes will not attract egalitarian concern because those tastes 
are seen by Dworkin as falling on the option luck side of the divide and, therefore, the 
responsibility of the person and not the political community.  
 
There is an important qualification given shortly after this passage which assigns some 
tastes, what Dworkin refers to as ‘obsessions’ or ‘cravings’, as belonging to people 
                                            
2 E. Anderson, ‘What is the Point of Equality?’, Ethics, 99/2 (1999). 
3 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, (Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, 2000). For other key statements see:  Richard Arneson, ‘Luck Egalitarianism and 
Prioritarianism’, Ethics 110/2, 339-49; Cohen G.A., ‘The Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, Ethics, 
99/4, (1989), pp. 906-943; J. Wolff, ‘Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos’, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 27/2, (1998), 97-122; P. Van Parijs, ‘Why Surfers Should be Fed’, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 20/2, (1991), 101-31; J. Roemer, ‘A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the 
Egalitarian Planner’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22, (1993), 146-66; S. Scheffler, ‘What is 
Egalitarianism?’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31/1 (2003); E. Anderson, ‘What is the Point of 
Equality?’, Ethics, 99/2 (1999).  
4 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p.1. 
5 Ibid., p.73. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., p.286. 
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accidentally. If someone has a preference that they do not want, because say, it is hard to 
satisfy or he or she does not identify with it, then Dworkin argues that it should be viewed in 
the same way as a handicap, for which one is not responsible. The distinction Dworkin 
makes here is between tastes or preferences ‘that define what a successful life would be like’ 
and those that do not.  
 
Dworkin’s recently published elaboration of these views involves two separate arguments 
why equality of resources has a better understanding of egalitarian insights than his critics. 
The first argument is an appeal to ordinary morality in a rather unconvincing way. Dworkin 
claims that we just find it bizarre to think of ourselves as needing to be pitied for having 
chosen this or that course of action or set of beliefs. Ordinary people, he says, ‘take 
consequential responsibility for their own personalities’.8 His second argument is to claim 
that our tastes are something that we might be said to identify with. He asks us to imagine 
someone who has an expensive involuntary taste for photography. Though the person 
recognises that there are hardships associated with his taste, if he were offered a pill to 
remove his taste he would decline it because, for him, photography is one of the things that is 
important in his life. That he would decline the pill in this case shows that his commitment to 
photography is part of a complex web of beliefs and judgements which has led him to affirm 
his commitment to photography and it would be wrong to view this person as someone to be 
pitied or assisted because of this involuntary taste. Dworkin’s argument is that causal 
responsibility for coming to have a taste is irrelevant to consequential responsibility. I will 
take it that Dworkin’s second argument is the stronger of his two arguments. Dworkin’s 
definition of responsibility then is: A person is responsible for their choices, tastes or 
preferences when they are endorsed by that person as being central to their conception of the 
good. And, where they have been authentically formed.9 
 
There is not the space here to go through other luck egalitarian discussions of equality, but 
we should note that Dworkin’s distinction is widely used as a starting point for discussion of 
responsibility. For instance, despite his relocation of Dworkin’s cut between option and brute 
luck G. A. Cohen argues along similar lines to Dworkin. Cohen’s response to Dworkin’s 
distinction between option and brute luck is to claim that egalitarian concern should be 
guided by a different distinction, that between responsibility and luck. Cohen’s cut differs 
from Dworkin’s in two ways. First, it awards redress to both welfare and resource 
disadvantages, instead of just resource disadvantage.  But for our present purposes the main 
difference is that he ‘foregrounds’ responsibility as he claims this is more faithful to 
Dworkin’s own intuition about egalitarianism, which is that no one should suffer because of 
bad brute luck. Cohen’s argument for his own responsibility/luck distinction is that what 
should guide egalitarian concern is whether or not disadvantage is incurred through choice, 
and both expensive tastes and resource deficiency might not have occurred through an 
agent’s choices. Cohen’s assignation of responsibility is both, as he puts it, ‘actual and 
                                            
8 Ibid., p. 290. 
9 Dworkin’s requirement for authenticity concerns the extent to which a person has the freedom to 
‘engage in activities crucial to forming and reviewing the convictions, commitments, associations, 
projects, and tastes that they bring to the auction’. Ibid., p.159. 
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counterfactual’.10 On Cohen’s view, a person is responsible for a taste or preference if it is 
traceable to a subject’s choice and where he/she would choose the taste or preference. Call 
this, ‘the conterfactual account of responsibility’.11 
 
In defending his responsibility-catering prioritarianism (RCP), Richard Arneson similarly 
defends a prominent role for responsibility. Arneson argues that, 
 
I myself am inclined to think that if two persons voluntarily engage in high stakes 
gambling, from which the loser emerges with unfavorable future life prospects, it is 
intrinsically, not merely instrumentally more valuable to provide the means to a one-
unit gain of well-being to someone who is just as badly off as the unlucky gambler 
but arrives at this condition through bad luck that is beyond his power to control than 
the unlucky gambler.12 
                                            
10 Cohen, ‘The Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, p. 920. In responding to Cohen’s claim that even if 
people have not suffered bad luck in their tastes, they might be said to have suffered bad luck in other 
people’s tastes, causing the goods they desire to be expensive, Dworkin introduces a further 
distinction between kinds of luck.  Dworkin admits that it is down to chance whether tastes of others 
make one’s own taste expensive but denies that this should be seen as a matter of compensation. 
Instead, what he claims is that other people’s tastes are features of the world just as natural 
environments are and are, in fact, ‘parameters of justice’, Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p. 299. 
11 Extending the scope of luck to cover preferences may well be a more egalitarian approach to the 
question of when egalitarian concern should be engaged.  But despite these differences Cohen argues 
that the proper aim of egalitarianism is described in the following way; ‘its purpose is to eliminate 
involuntary disadvantage, by which I (stipulatively) mean disadvantage for which the sufferer cannot 
be held responsible, since it does not appropriately reflect choices that he has made or is making or 
would make.’, Cohen, ‘The Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, p. 916. Further on he writes, ‘On my 
understanding of egalitarianism, it does not enjoin redress of or compensation for disadvantage as 
such. It attends, rather, to ‘involuntary’ disadvantage, which is the sort that does not reflect the 
subject’s choice.’, Ibid., p.920. For recent discussion of this debate see: Ronald Dworkin, ‘Sovereign 
Virtue Revisited’, Ethics, 113 (2002); Andrew Williams, ‘Dworkin on Capability’, Ethics, 113 (2002); 
Mathew Clayton, ‘Liberal Equality and Ethics’, Ethics, 113 (2002). 
12 Arneson R., ‘Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism’, Ethics 110/2, (2000) p. 8. For Arneson’s 
earlier views see: Arneson, R. (1989), ‘Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare’, Philosophical 
Studies 56 pp. 77-93. To some extent the power of Arneson’s appeal to responsibility is gained 
through a focus on a narrow conception of responsibility. For example, an egalitarian might respond 
that even if his objection is accurate many cases of disadvantage are not like the one Arneson 
highlights. For instance, We might divide these cases into different classes of comparison. Arneson’s 
case is a simple comparative case in that it asks who we should aid when faced with a choice between 
two disadvantaged people, one responsible one not. But many cases of bad option luck are not like 
this. Comparative cases can be further divided into what I will call complex comparative cases. A 
complex comparative case might involve comparing very different options. For instance, there might 
be a choice between giving assistance to someone with bad option luck to lift them out of destitution 
or giving the resources to someone who is above a threshold and will use the resources to enhance 
their well-being to very high levels. Here again the intuition is not as obvious as it at first seems. If the 
second individual was extremely rich and the first individual was now destitute as a result of a prudent 
choice that had gone wrong, would we automatically distribute all our pot of resources to individual 
2? There are plausibly a class of complex comparative cases which are not captured by Arneson’s 
examples. 
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While Arneson’s position differs from the two above in defending prioritarianism and not 
equality, it nonetheless still condones potentially severe disadvantage when it is a matter of 
bad option luck. 
 
It is not my aim in what follows to adjudicate between the different conceptions of 
responsibility as such. Let me summarise these conceptions. For Dworkin a person is 
consequentially responsible when their choice results from their personal characteristics with 
which they identify and which have been formed authentically. For Cohen, disadvantage is a 
matter of egalitarian concern where a person’s situation is a result of a choice which itself 
results from a character trait that the person was not responsible for acquiring and would not 
choose to acquire. While Dworkin’s cut seems to place more responsibility with an agent 
than does Cohen’s, both accounts foreground responsibility as one of the key criteria for 
distinguishing between those who warrant egalitarian concern and those who do not. Both of 
these accounts structure their understanding of how we should conceive egalitarianism in 
terms of the ideal of fairness. It is fair that we compensate for bad brute luck and unfair if we 
compensate for bad option luck. Arneson’s view is perhaps more explicit than the other two 
in emphasizing a prominent role for responsibility. 
 
II. THE CAPABILITY APPROACH AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
As is well known, when assessing the information base of justice the capability approach 
focuses not just on people’s actual achievements of well-being, but their freedom to achieve 
functionings. According to Sen, the advantages of expanding the information base to include 
freedom and not just achievement are twofold. First, including freedom allows us to 
appreciate the opportunities that a person had to achieve various functionings. Part of the 
reason that Sen considers this important is because of its relevance for aspects of social and 
political analysis. But clearly one part of political analysis where this freedom is important 
concerns judgements of people’s responsibility for their disadvantage. One of the advantages 
of an approach that focuses on freedom to achieve well-being is that it allows us to widen the 
information base by adding a causal dimension to analyses of capability deficits. As we saw 
above, starving can be distinguished from fasting by noting whether a person has the 
freedom to be malnourished.13 The second reason why freedom is important is that choosing 
itself may be directly relevant to a person’s well-being. Here freedom might be intrinsically 
valuable to a person’s life. I want to take it for granted that introducing freedom into our 
                                                                                                                           
 
A third type of case might be where, because of institutional structures, it makes little or no difference 
whether we aid someone with bad option luck. There are many cases where someone suffers bad 
option luck and it is not a choice between them and another person directly. If a society has 
established a health program to combat malaria amoung aid workers and it makes little difference 
whether the anti-malaria tablets are produced in large or small quantities, then it might be that there is 
no discernable cost difference in expanding the distribution to the people who got malaria through 
their own choices. Call this the ‘cost indifference’ comparative case. 
13 Amartya Sen, ‘Well-Being, Agency and Freedom’, The Journal of Philosophy, 82/4 (1985), p. 201. 
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information base does provide significant advantages over a purely achievement based 
approach. Sen’s approach seeks to include freedom in the assessment of what a person is 
entitled to claim from society. But what needs further clarification is what role the concept of 
responsibility should play in assessments of permissible inequalities in a conception of 
justice.  
 
As we saw above, one of the ways in which freedom is important for social and political 
analysis is as a criterion for determining whether an inequality is a matter of justice or 
merely a private concern. Sen has stressed the importance of freedom as we saw, but has not 
clarified his understanding of the role of responsibility, even though it is clearly one of the 
central aspects of political analysis on which a freedom based approach allows us to focus. 
Sen has discussed this to some extent, however. Part of Sen’s critique of Rawls was based on 
the need to acknowledge the difficulties that might arise for a person in converting primary 
goods into actual freedoms if they suffered from illness or more conventional constraints.14 
Sen argued that there would be disadvantages suffered as a result of conversion problems, 
but it is also true to say that the consequences should not be seen as being the responsibility 
of the agent. Sen’s critique has thus increased our understanding of when someone can be 
held responsible. He also notes the interdependence of notions of freedom and responsibility 
by stressing that responsibility requires freedom of the sort advocated by the capability 
approach. Through providing basic capabilities an individual will be freed from the 
constraints of ill health and poor education as well as provided with significant options about 
which she might responsibly deliberate. Thus the capability approach both recognises the 
importance of responsibility and promotes it by increasing freedom. Further, he argues that it 
might be counterproductive were social responsibility to replace individual responsibility.15   
 
However, it is the more contentious issue of where a person has effective freedom over his or 
her choices yet chooses badly or foolishly that the issue of personal responsibility begins to 
bite. In places Sen identifies himself with the general distinction that we observed earlier 
between choices that are under our control and those that are not. Here the importance of 
distinguishing between freedom and achievements becomes apparent. As we saw above, for 
the capability approach it is more appropriate to see the claims of individuals on society in 
terms of the freedom to achieve rather than actual functioning.16 In addition, one of the 
advantages of the capability approach is that it allows us more information on whether a 
person had opportunities to achieve various important functionings. Not only does the 
addition of freedom here provide us with more information, but he seems to suggest that this 
information should be used to determine the justice or otherwise of inequalities. He writes 
that where a person is able to exercise freedom yet wastes their opportunities such that an 
inequality results, that, plausibly, no injustice has occurred.17 Redescribed in terms of the 
starving/fasting example discussed above, the rich and religious faster is clearly responsible 
                                            
14 Amartya Sen, ‘Equality of What?’, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ed., S. McMurrin 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
15 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 12. 
16 Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 148. 
17 Sen, Development as Freedom, pp. 283-89; Sen, ‘Capability and Well-Being’ The Quality of Life, 
eds., M. Nussbaum and A. Sen, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1993), p.38. 
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for his malnutrition, whereas the starving person is not. If, as suggested, freedom should be a 
factor in our political analysis, then the addition of responsibility will often be decisive in 
concluding that some capability deficits will not be the responsibility of the state. Of course, 
incorporating responsibility might be done in a number of ways. One could use it as a 
criterion only when basic capabilities were not in danger, such as when a person jeopardised 
not his health but only his wealth. Alternatively, one could follow the example of some 
theorists of equality and argue that even consequences of choices that led to severe 
disadvantage should be bourn by the agent. I am not suggesting that either of these 
approaches are what Sen would opt for, merely that to rule out either approach we need 
further arguments about the role and scope of responsibility.   
 
We should note that Sen’s use of responsibility is sensitive to the (often serious) information 
constraints that accompany judgements about the presence or absence of freedom. He notes 
that we might have to forego focusing on the freedom and just concentrate on achievements 
in the presence of uncertainty about whether a person was in control or a victim of bad 
luck.18 But it still seems that for Sen, where we can be sure that we are dealing with 
responsible adults who are exercising genuine choice, if their choices go wrong, then it is 
possible to argue that no injustice has occured. But as we will see, this claim will depend on 
just what unfortunate consequences occur as a result of the choice.  
 
Nussbaum: a threshold view 
 
One way of understanding the capability approach that might allow us to deal with a 
conception of responsibility is through the idea of a threshold. This is, indeed, the model that 
Nussbaum advances. She is in favour of a threshold, ‘beneath which it is held that truly 
human functioning is not available to citizens; the social goal should be understood in terms 
of getting citizens above this capability threshold’.19 In Women and Human Development 
Nussbaum’s aim is to provide the philosophical underpinning to basic constitutional 
principles that any government could implement. As such, Nussbaum’s use of the capability 
approach offers a surer way of dealing with at least some distributional questions because it 
does not concern itself with capability deficits above the threshold.20 Like Sen’s interest in 
basic capabilities as opposed to all possible capabilities, it identifies not just a ‘space’, but 
identifies some capabilities as more important than others.  
 
Nussbaum’s account does not make use of the agency/well-being distinction favoured by 
Sen, believing instead, that the functionings/capability distinction captures the important 
aspects of the approach. These and other differences aside, Nussbaum’s threshold approach 
                                            
18 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, pp. 148-50. 
19 Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 
2000): p.6. Nussbaum’s main justification for this view is that without a certain level of capability in 
these central areas people are not able to live in a truly human way. Nussbaum believes that truly 
human functioning can be the subject of an overlapping consensus, ibid., p.74. 
20 While offering more definite information on which capabilities are important, Nussbaum’s 
approach raises problems concerning how it might be possible to agree on her list of capabilities. 
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nonetheless raises similar questions about the role and scope of responsibility to Sen’s. 
Sidelining considerations of capability deficits that are above the threshold still does not tell 
us what to do when someone exercises their capabilities in a way that is foolish or 
irresponsible, and that leads to them dropping below the threshold. Nussbaum, of course, 
allows that there might be cases where people choose not to take up certain capabilities and 
turn them into functionings, but this is a different issue. 
 
Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach also recognises each person as a source of 
agency, stressing that people are typically the best source of what is good for them.21 She 
also argues that capabilities and not functionings are the proper target of public action 
because, for one thing, they treat people as adults and not children. Part of how we treat 
people as adults is to respect their own conceptions of the good life. She claims that citizens 
should be provided with capabilities and then be able to ‘chart their own course after that’.22 
Where a person has opportunities for sexual satisfaction yet chooses celibacy we should 
respect their choice to abstain from that particular capability. On Nussbaum’s view, a person 
should have responsibility for their choices and we should grant them the freedom to 
exercise this responsibility. But there are at least two ways of interpreting this claim. The 
first way, which is what I think Nussbaum intends, is that we should respect people’s 
freedom to use their capability set in the way that is consistent with their life plan. Doing so 
recognises them as an end and not just a means. We can call this ‘choice responsibility’. But 
it is not clear how far this impulse extends. Recognising people’s responsibility might also 
mean letting them bear the costs of their choices as well. On this second interpretation, 
where someone makes foolish choices that leads to a capability loss — say through smoking 
or gambling — we might permit them to suffer some measure of capability deficit and not 
regard it as a matter of justice. Call this interpretation ‘outcome responsibility’. At any rate, 
it is not clear whether Nussbaum thinks that people should bear the costs of their choices 
when this would take them below a threshold level of capabilities. As both interpretations are 
consistent with her position, we need further arguments to clarify the role and scope of 
responsibility in these contexts. 
 
While both Nussbaum and Sen address the question of people’s responsibility in different 
and important ways, it remains unclear how each of them would respond to the issue of bad 
option luck that leads to basic capability deficits. As we saw above, Sen indicated that he 
would observe the brute/option luck distinction, but it is not clear to what extent and when. 
Nussbaum’s threshold approach is similarly ambiguous on how to respond to capability 
deficits caused by bad option luck. The position is consistent with either choice or outcome 
responsibility. It may well be that neither advocate intends as large a role for responsibility 
as some other recent theorists of justice, such as Dworkin and Cohen. But if this is the case, 
then we need to be aware of the arguments for what I will call a ‘responsibility ignoring’ 
approach to justice. In light of recent debates about equality and responsibility, I will 
elaborate what I think is the best response to these questions. Such an elaboration is 
warranted because some conceptions of the role of responsibility that are consistent with the 
positions outlined above lead to very harsh results for the disadvantaged. Second, it is 
                                            
21 Ibid., p. 51. 
22 Ibid., p. 87. 
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important to be clear about this response if only to understand the type of ethos or ideal that 
a capability approach to justice should adopt. I will argue that a capability approach is 
consistent with a properly egalitarian ethos, one which will limit the role and scope of 
individual responsibility with respect to basic capabilities. Interpreting the capability 
approach to equality as egalitarian will avoid some of the potentially harmful consequences 
of responsibility-based accounts of justice, which I set out below. There are two objections 
to responsibility-based capability approaches that are particularly relevant here. They are 
what I will call the ‘disastrous consequences’ and ‘epistemological’ objections.  
 
III. THE COSTS OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Disastrous consequences  
 
As we have seen, many of those committed to upholding a conception of equality deploy a 
conception of responsibility to assess where assistance is justified. But many of those who 
claim to work in an egalitarian tradition have recently come under fire for letting 
responsibility considerations take precedence over other egalitarian intuitions. For instance, 
in an insightful article on equality, Elizabeth Anderson argues that recent writing on equality 
has lost sight of the proper aims and origins of egalitarian thought. The ‘luck egalitarians’, as 
she calls them, think that the main aim of egalitarianism is to compensate people for 
undeserved bad luck, leaving many victims of bad option luck to their fates. She claims that 
for those who exhibit bad option luck, luck egalitarians prescribe rugged individualism, 
where individuals are asked to take responsibility for their own choices even when that 
would leave them destitute. Where bad brute luck applies, they prescribe a pooling of risks 
and resources, but in a way that smacks of paternalism. Anderson also claims that luck 
egalitarianism fails the test of what a true egalitarian theory should be because it fails to treat 
people with equal concern and respect.23  
 
Under luck egalitarianism the victims of bad option luck fare particularly badly according to 
Anderson. She presents a series of cases that highlight the harshness of the doctrine. For 
instance, she asks us to consider the case of a negligent driver who injures himself in a car 
accident. All things being equal, the costs of initial emergency care and subsequent care 
should, on the luck egalitarian account, be bourn by the driver because his actions are a 
                                            
23 Despite the appearance of humanitarianism, Anderson claims that the luck egalitarians also fail to 
treat the victims of bad brute luck with the respect and concern that they deserve. In particular, luck 
egalitarianism fails to properly identify who is worst off. For instance, she claims that Dworkin’s 
scheme to compensate those who insure against disability discriminates against those who fail to 
insure against rare diseases that they could not foresee contracting. And for those that luck 
egalitarianism does aid, it is deeply disrespectful. Towards those who are disabled, talentless or 
socially awkward, Anderson claims that the luck egalitarians would make intrusive judgements about 
their disadvantage in order to compensate them, effectively raising ‘private disdain to the status of 
officially recognised truth’ thereby reproducing the stigmatising approach of the Poor Laws, ‘What is 
the Point of Equality?’, p. 306. 
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result of option luck. Similar examples point to how luck egalitarianism abandons the 
prudent when their luck turns sour. For example, if someone chooses to live in a geographic 
location occasionally afflicted by cyclones, then the state would not be obligated to give 
them disaster relief if the worst happened. Similarly, workers who choose risky occupations 
might also not be compensated by the state should they suffer an accident at work.24  
 
The responsibility-based equality discussed in the previous section cannot easily avoid these 
examples. These cases are all instances of bad option luck in the Dworkinian sense. The 
negligent driver is not a victim of bad brute luck but of his or her own negligence.25 
Capability-based accounts of justice will also find it hard to avoid these harsh results if they 
adhere to an unmodified version of the option/brute luck distinction. As Anderson’s 
examples show, bad option luck can lead to severe capability deficits. If we insist that the 
freedom that an individual made use of be employed to determine their eligibility for 
assistance of some kind, as at least some of Sen’s comments indicate, then the capabilities 
deficits suffered will not be a matter of justice. Similarly, on the outcome responsibility 
interpretation, Nussbaum’s threshold view is consistent with these inegalitarian results. So 
where someone’s option luck goes wrong and they drop below the threshold, Nussbaum’s 
view might plausibly not offer any compensation. While I am not claiming that these are the 
positions intended by defenders of the approach, their positions are at least open to these 
objections in the absence of arguments to limit the scope of responsibility.  
 
In one respect, Nussbaum’s insistence that a life is not properly human without a threshold 
of capabilities makes it easier to see what is wrong with a responsibility-based account of 
capability justice. If falling below a threshold level of capabilities will mean that a person 
does not lead a truly human life, then this at least provides a basis for limiting the scope of 
responsibility in those situations where there are severe capability deficits. Indeed, as I will 
argue below, this claim is consistent with an appropriate ethos of egalitarianism. 
 
Uncertainty, information and the case of the unemployed 
 
Apart from the disastrous consequences that might befall those who are made to bear the 
costs of their bad option luck, adhering to the option/brute luck distinction may also be 
difficult to administer. For many of the unemployed, if their level of benefits is tied to their 
responsibility for their situation, the use of responsibility criteria can lead to harmful results. 
Such procedures involve distinguishing between cases where a person is able but unwilling 
to work and cases where some other factor prevents them from working. Those responsible 
for making such evaluations typically ask about a person’s motivation, their efforts made to 
secure employment, family situation, willingness to move locations, their past employment 
history and the reasons they are no longer employed. In effect, what such procedures seek to 
                                            
24 Anderson provides nine types of bad option luck that she thinks the luck egalitarians do not 
adequately address. Ibid., pp. 296-99. 
25 Similarly for Cohen, so long as the person did not acquire their driving habits as a result of 
brainwashing or circumstances he could not otherwise avoid, then he would, all things being equal, 
forfeit the right to assistance if responsibility was the criterion for permitting deviations from equality. 
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establish is a person’s personal responsibility for whether or not they are unemployed. While 
I do not wish to argue that it is impossible to determine responsibility for unemployment, 
there are epistemic reasons for doubting that this can be done accurately on a large scale as is 
typically required. We should note that this is typically done on a mass scale by employment 
agencies, often with limited resources. Except in glaringly obvious cases where a person 
either admits that they are not trying to get a job or they are caught perpetrating a fraud, it is 
often an imprecise process. There are a range of factors that might play a role here. For an 
assessment to be complete an assessor might have to consider a person’s past responsibility 
in acquiring marketable skills, their efforts in finding jobs, the nature of the job market and, 
importantly, the person’s motivation. All of these things produce a very complex picture out 
of which governments and their representatives have to decide the issue of personal 
responsibility. Consider a version of the case made by Anderson which she calls 
‘geographical discrimination among citizens’.26 In many Western countries there are regions 
that are both remote from populous centres and lacking in sustainable employment. These 
regions have higher unemployment than is common in that country as a whole or even in the 
local state or territory. Where does responsibility for being unemployed lie for people who 
either remain in that region or voluntarily relocate to it? In the former case it might be 
impossible to go through all of the factors that might influence such an assessment. But it is 
easy to imagine that where a person has attachments and commitments to a location it might 
be possible for someone to leave that place but be very costly for them to do so. What these 
examples point to is that it is often hard to determine responsibility for being unemployed in 
a straightforward way.27 This is not to say it is impossible, just that it is complex.28 But it is 
also very important to get it right as the consequences for the individuals whose eligibility 
for welfare benefits is being assessed are often extraordinarily high. What might the 
consequences of judgements about eligibility for welfare be and why might the 
consequences be so high? Our first guide here is how such judgements about responsibility 
for unemployment operate in real world scenarios. In the United States, United Kingdom and 
Australia it is typical for welfare systems to deny or reduce benefits to those it deems to be 
                                            
26 Anderson, ‘What is the Point of Equality?’, p. 296. 
27 See also Brian Barry, ‘Chance, Choice and Justice’ in Liberty and Justice, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989). 
28 Someone might object, as indeed Arneson does, that his account of responsibility was pitched at the 
level of ideal theory, whereas claims about epistemic difficulties are pitched at a lower level and so 
miss their mark, Arneson, ‘Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism’, p.345. I cannot deal with this 
fully here, but let me note one possible response. Whether or not we endorse the employment of an 
ideal of responsibility as I have described it is tied up with the work that it is required to perform – 
whether it is cast in the right institutional setting. Using responsibility in some contexts is appropriate. 
For example, where two people both place small bets on a race and one loses we do not think that the 
loser has suffered an injustice. Nor do we think it particularly noteworthy that the winner gains a small 
reward. But things get less intuitive for the luck egalitarian where someone loses their health and not 
their wealth. We noted earlier Elizabeth Anderson’s example of the negligent driver. In such a case we 
typically don’t think that a person should be left to bear the costs of their own actions. One reason for 
this is that when consequences are severe enough that someone’s life is threatened and we can save 
them an arguably more powerful intuition is that we should. It seems counter intuitive that what is 
most important here is that people be made to account for their choices. Without knowing something 
about the proper institutional setting it is difficult for ideals to perform one of their most important 
functions, that is as guides to action in the real world. 
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responsible for being unemployed. The severity of the consequences of this decision will of 
course vary from place to place, but in many of these welfare systems the financial and 
social impact of a reduction of benefits is often catastrophic for the unemployed. So, one 
might agree with conditional obligations but reject them as difficult to enact on 
epistemological grounds, as Sen suggests.29 
 




I have offered two primary reasons why a capability-based account of justice should ignore 
questions of responsibility in cases where individuals fall below a threshold of basic 
capabilities. These objections go some way towards providing the additional arguments that 
a capability approach requires in order to avoid going down the luck egalitarian path and 
prioritizing responsibility. But we should also note that, in part, these objections derive their 
force from the clash between responsibility criteria and other values to which egalitarians 
have typically adhered. Indeed, this claim has been the focus of recent discussion of the 
appropriate ethos for egalitarianism.30 At issue is whether an ideal of making people 
responsible for their choices should have priority over other ideals. In closing, I want to 
briefly sketch why the capability approach is closer to an ideal of egalitarianism that does not 
give priority to a concept of responsibility, but instead is linked to an ideal of placing people 
in relations of equality with one another – an ideal of equal standing. In addition, I will argue 
that capability equality is also compatible with a more traditional and demanding form of 
equality than some of the weaker versions that are now sometimes associated with 
egalitarianism, including by some capability theorists. 
 
A number of egalitarians, including Anderson in places, have sought to overcome the deficits 
of responsibility-based egalitarianism by focusing on the broader ethos or ideal of equality. 
Proponents of a broader ideal of equality stress that the aim of equality must include 
reference to something more basic than compensating deficits caused by faulty luck of 
whatever kind. Instead of focusing on the requirement to correctly allot the costs of choices 
and ameliorate the effects of brute bad luck, egalitarians should attend to things such as 
placing people in relations of equality with one another. Egalitarians who do not give priority 
to ideals of responsibility emphasise that egalitarianism is regulated by moral and political 
ideals, which are broader than luck egalitarianism in that they do not simply focus on 
allotting resources on the basis of a person’s responsibility in causing their disadvantage. In a 
recent article, Samuel Scheffler helpfully distinguishes between moral, political and social 
                                            
29 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, pp. 148-50. We should note too, that the capability deficits that people 
might suffer as a result of bad option luck may also lack proportionality. If a person loses their health 
or mobility as a result of a poor choice, then the disadvantage they suffer as a result of their 
misfortune is out of proportion to their choice. 
30 Scheffler, ‘What is Egalitarianism?’, Larry S. Temkin, ‘Egalitarianism  Defended’, Ethics, 113, 
2003, 764-782. 
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ideals that might all play a part in regulating egalitarianism. The moral ideal of equality 
concerns the claim that everyone has equal worth and has a right to be treated accordingly. 
As a social ideal, equality relates to the goal of a society as a cooperative arrangement 
among individuals. As a political ideal, it stresses the claims that we are able to make on one 
another as citizens, the goal being to place citizens in relations of equality with one 
another.31  
 
The moral ideal that everyone’s life is equally important is shared by all types of 
egalitarians, as it is by most non-egalitarians as well.32 But while this is a necessary 
condition for being an egalitarian it is arguably not sufficient. While I cannot give a full 
account of these claims here, what distinguishes egalitarians is that they support a political 
version of this ideal, which aims to place people in relations of equal standing across a range 
of politically relevant indicators. Equal standing will have a negative aim, which is to 
remove barriers to equality of various sorts – oppressive social relationships, material wants 
and so on – and a positive aim, which will be to enable people to stand in relations of 
equality with one another by providing relevant resources to them directly or by establishing 
appropriate institutions. Establishing people in relations of equal standing will therefore cut 
across different dimensions of well-being. What is noteworthy about this version of 
egalitarianism is that it gives priority not to responsibility but to a broader ideal of equality.  
 
In addition to being both responsibility ignoring and prioritising a political ideal of equal 
standing, I want to suggest that there is a third feature that is also required for a theory to be 
egalitarian, and that concerns the content of egalitarianism. Egalitarian theories are 
distinguished partly by the extent to which they equalise substantial elements of people’s 
condition. To illustrate my point let me contrast my claim with some recent claims about 
egalitarianism.  
 
A number of egalitarians have argued for a very weak form of egalitarianism that is 
excessively broad. In fact, egalitarianism now seems to encompass almost any concern for 
equality. Dworkin’s claim that every plausible political theory exists on an ‘egalitarian 
plateau’, has gained wide acceptance.33 The claim is that every plausible political theory 
assumes that the interests of the members of the community matter, and matter equally. The 
approach is now widespread. Indeed, Sen endorses this rather minimalist view. While 
claiming that all plausible approaches to the ethics of social arrangements require equality of 
                                            
31 Scheffler, ‘What is Egalitarianism?’, p. 22. But we should note that even the luck egalitarianism 
would not dispute the relevance of a moral ideal of treating with equal concern and respect. It is not 
the denial of this ideal that is problematic, rather, it is the interpretation and the translation into the 
political ideal of equality. The problem with luck egalitarianism concerns giving priority to 
responsibility-based principles at the expense of the political ideal of placing citizens in relations of 
equality with each other, as this is how one treats them with respect. 
32 Some authors who do not incorporate a theory of equality also call themselves egalitarians. 
Prioritarians or non relational egalitarians such as Derek Parfit, claim that what is important for 
egalitarians is prioritising the worst-off. I leave aside the question of whether egalitarians must adopt a 
theory of equality or merely priority. See Derek Parfit, ‘Equality or Priority’, Ratio, 10/3: 1997, 202-
22. 
33 Ronald Dworkin, ‘In Defense of Equality’, Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol.1/1, 1983, pp. 24-5. 
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something, Sen claims that all these theories are egalitarian. He writes, ‘I also argue that this 
common feature of being egalitarian in some significant way relates to the need to have 
equal concern, at some level, for all persons involved’.34 As he notes, such a definition 
would also include Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia as amoung the list of 
egalitarian theories because of Nozick’s attempt to treat people as moral equals. But any 
egalitarian who includes Nozick as a fellow traveller is surely wide of the mark. While we 
might agree that a concern for equality at some level is required of a plausible political 
theory, that does not entail that all those theories are egalitarian. For a theory to be an 
egalitarian one, it needs a more substantial content than what I will call the weak egalitarian 
thesis of equal concern. The weak egalitarian thesis — a theory is egalitarian if it has some 
sort of basal equality — will not serve as a defining feature of egalitarianism. While it is no 
doubt true that all theories that deserve to be taken seriously will seek to equalise something, 
what they equalise will determine whether or not they are properly egalitarian.  A theory that 
equalizes political rights for instance will not thus be egalitarian or only partially as it is a 
‘weak’ egalitarianism. As well as being responsibility ignoring and appealing to a broader 
ethos of equality, egalitarians need to attend to substantial parts of people’s condition. While 
this might seem like an obvious point, it is worth restating it as the point seems to have been 
overlooked in recent debates.35 
 
Let me say a little more about what a richer account of egalitarianism might entail. We have 
pointed to the need for a richer account of egalitarianism that incorporates some of the 
concerns we referred to above, such as placing people in relations of equality with one 
another and thereby ensuring that people are treated with respect, which are two of the 
necessary features that I (stipulatively) define as being part of egalitarianism. Appealing to 
these broader moral and political ideals as some contemporary egalitarians do, is a way of 
distinguishing between weak and strong egalitarianism as well as countering some of the 
more unfortunate consequences of responsibility-based accounts.  But we should also note 
that there are likely distributive consequences for this type of egalitarian ethos. While a fuller 
account of these implications would need to consider a whole range of theoretical and 
practical factors normally associated with distributive justice, likely implications might 
include: an emphasis on the public provision of key goods, and concern for substantive in 
addition to formal freedoms. 
 
To return to our original starting point, I have argued that while the capability approach to 
equality is best interpreted as consistent with a strong version of egalitarianism, it has 
nonetheless been ambiguous on the proper role and scope of responsibility. Clarifying the 
ethos of the approach has helped to understand how to remove this ambiguity. Indeed, the 
two objections to responsibility-based accounts discussed above provide us with some 
indication of what should form part of this ethos. First, capability equality should aim to 
                                            
34 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, p.1. 
35 We can see that one of the differences between weak and strong egalitarian theory is that weak 
egalitarianism only subscribes to the ideal of moral equality, whereas a strong egalitarian will at least 
uphold the political ideal of equality. For a different way of making a similar point see J. Raz’s 
comments on ‘strict’ vs ‘rhetorical’ egalitarianism in The Morality of Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), pp. 227-233. 
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avoid the sorts of disastrous consequences that leave people without basic capabilities. 
Positively, this equates to a goal of enabling people to stand in relations of equality with one 
another. Second, if the epistemological objection is correct, then the approach should also 
aim to treat people with equal concern and respect. While these two arguments do not 
exhaust an egalitarian ethos, they are both consistent with our description of the ethos of the 
capability approach. If it is an egalitarian approach to justice as I have argued, then it should 
be responsibility ignoring below a certain threshold of basic capabilities, as to do otherwise 
would violate key parts of the egalitarian ethos. These conclusions find some support in Sen 
and Nussbaum’s work as incorporating this more traditional egalitarian ideal seems to have 
been part of the aim of the capability approach as well. Both Sen and Nussbaum have argued 
that the aim of their respective approaches is to ensure that certain basic or central human 
capabilities are available to individuals. Nussbaum’s threshold approach focuses on 
establishing a capability threshold, in part, because without human capabilities life may not 
be fully human, but also because it flows from a commitment to treat each person as an end. 
Sen’s motivation seems less concerned to tie the importance of basic capabilities to being 
fully human. But it is nonetheless clear that the thrust of his approach suggests that basic 
capabilities are essential for people’s lives to go well. For instance, in discussing the 
‘perspective of freedom’ in relation to development, Sen stresses that his approach aims at 
substantial freedoms that provide people with the opportunity to achieve their conception of 
the good.36 Leaving aside the question of which capabilities attract egalitarian concern and 
on how they might be justified, the list typically includes capabilities that seek to ensure 
substantial freedoms and to raise people to relations of equality with one another.  The nature 
of the capabilities that are often listed as important includes an emphasis on the provision of 
public goods and on ensuring real freedoms. For example, the capability for health is likely 
to include actions by public agencies to remove threats to health — sources of infectious 
diseases, poor dietary habits and so on. These are typically public and not private tasks. 
 
This is necessarily a limited conclusion concerning the distributive and other implications of 
the approach. For instance, it does not mean that responsibility should never play a role in an 
account of justice, merely that it should not figure where people are below a certain 
threshold. Above that threshold the option/brute luck distinction may be useful for 
determining who is entitled to various forms of public assistance. But it does mean that the 
role of responsibility needs more attention than it has hitherto been given. While a capability 
approach to justice is clearly freedom centred and closely attuned to the causal features of 
disadvantage, it remains ambiguous with respect to the role and scope of responsibility 
within an account of equality. By locating capability equality within a strong conception of 
egalitarianism, it is possible to argue that the approaches other commitments require us to 
limit the role and scope of responsibility within a capability approach to equality. 
                                            
36 Sen, Development as Freedom, ch. 1. 
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